



### ORGANIZED CRIME PROFILING

Crime type	Crime enablers & pathways	Joint Initiatives
<b>Terrorism</b>	<b>Terrorism</b>	The main role of the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) is that of increasing access to crime research information towards crime prevention. The National Crime Research Centre therefore collaborates with public, private and civil society sector institutions in as far as crime and security related research information initiatives are concerned. These institutions include:
Terrorism has become a somewhat common crime in Kenya’s major towns and on its border with Somalia. Most of the perpetrators of this crime are associated with the Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda groups. The creation and operationalization of the National Counter-terrorism Centre is one of the efforts of the Kenya Government to address this type of crime.	Enablers and pathways of terrorism include: political instability in Somalia, porous border points, cultural socio-cultural intolerance, misguided ideologies, youth alienation, radicalization of individuals, corruption in both private and public sectors, loopholes that allow terrorists to circumvent the	<p><b>The Judiciary</b></p> <p>The Judiciary is a member of the Governing Council of the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC).</p> <p>NCRC participates as a member of the Technical Committee and the full Council in the Judiciary’s National Council on the Administration of Justice (NCAJ). NCRC is also the second representative of the Attorney General in the NCAJ for purposes of articulating the AG’s technical crime research issues at the NCAJ.</p>

	law and pass through security safeguards, irresponsible media coverage of terrorism and inadequate cooperation/collaboration between the local community and security agencies.	For more information about the Judiciary in Kenya, view: <a href="http://www.judiciary.go.ke">www.judiciary.go.ke</a>
<b>Money Laundering</b>	<b>Money Laundering</b>	<p><b>National Police Service</b></p> <p>The National Police Service is a member of the Governing Council of the National Crime Research Centre.</p> <p>The Centre has, on the request of the National Police Service, undertaken a study on Organized Criminal Gangs in Kenya with a view to informing policy on criminal gangs in the country.</p> <p>The Centre has previously made a presentation on “Emerging Crime Trends And Organized Criminal Gangs” during the Administration Police Service Annual Conference 2012 at the Pride Inn Sai Rock Beach Hotel In Mombasa.</p> <p>For more information about the National Police Service, view: <a href="http://www.nationalpolice.go.ke">http://www.nationalpolice.go.ke</a></p>
Money Laundering (ML) is the process of concealing assets generated by crime to be used in committing or facilitating commission of crime. Organized criminal groups generate large amounts of money by activities such as drug trafficking, arms smuggling and financial crime. The money is of little use to them unless they can disguise it and convert it into funds that are available for investment into legitimate enterprise. The methods they use for converting its ‘dirty’ money into ‘clean’	Enablers and pathways of Money Laundering include: corruption in the financial and banking sector, weak financial monitoring systems, international philanthropic and charity activities, cross-border smuggling and inadequately policed borders, investment of laundered money into real estate and legitimate	<p><b>Probation and Aftercare Services</b></p> <p>The Department of Probation and Aftercare Services is a member of the Governing Council of the National Crime Research Centre. The Service is primarily concerned with the supervision of non-custodial court sanctions and the rehabilitation, reintegration and resettlement of non-custodial offenders back into the community.</p> <p>The Centre is mandated to research into the efficacy and adequacy of rehabilitation of offenders in Kenya towards realizing a crime-free society. NCRC has therefore lately</p>

<p>assets encourages corruption. ML is bad for international and domestic trade, banking reputations and for effective governments and rule of law.</p> <p>The policy aim in this area is to make the financial markets transparent, and minimize the circulation of criminal money and its cost upon legitimate markets.</p>	<p>businesses and offshore bank accounts.</p>	<p>conducted studies on the delivery of community-based sentences in Kenya with a view to informing policy and programmes on effective supervision and rehabilitation of non-custodial offenders in Kenya.</p> <p>For more information about Probation and Aftercare Services, view: <a href="http://www.probation.go.ke">www.probation.go.ke</a></p>
<p><b>Counterfeiting</b></p>	<p><b>Counterfeiting</b></p>	<p><b>Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions</b></p> <p>The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions is a member of the Governing Council of the National Crime Research Centre.</p> <p>Among its functions, the Centre is mandated to research into the efficacy and adequacy of prosecutions in Kenya towards the effective and efficient administration of criminal justice in Kenya.</p> <p>For more information about the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in Kenya, view: <a href="http://www.odpp.go.ke">www.odpp.go.ke</a></p>
<p>Counterfeiting involves the production and trading in fakes. In Kenya, the scope of counterfeit products includes food, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, electrical components, tobacco, shoe polish, body creams/jellies and even household cleaning products in addition to the usual films, music, literature, electrical appliances, software and fashion.</p> <p>The mission of the Anti-Counterfeit Agency in Kenya is to combat counterfeiting and prohibit trade in counterfeit goods through training, research, consumer awareness and co-</p>	<p>Some primary enablers of the counterfeit crime include: cross-border smuggling and inadequately policed borders, huge profits realized by transnational criminal operations, advantage of modern advances in communications and transportation to globalize counterfeiting, the ability of criminal organizations to recruit professionals in the counterfeit business and ability to manipulate the</p>	<p><b>Kenya Prisons Service</b></p> <p>The Kenya Prisons Service is a member of the Governing Council of the National Crime Research Centre.</p> <p>The National Crime Research Act CAP 62 Laws of Kenya mandates the Centre to research into the efficacy and adequacy of rehabilitation of custodial offenders in Kenya with a view to realizing full rehabilitation of the incarcerated offenders.</p> <p>For more information about the Kenya Prisons Service, view: <a href="http://www.prisons.go.ke">http://www.prisons.go.ke</a></p>

ordination with national, regional and international organizations in the effective enforcement of intellectual property rights.	advantage of diplomatic relations.	
<b>Drug trafficking</b>	<b>Drug trafficking</b>	<p><b>The National Treasury</b></p> <p>The National Treasury is a member of the Governing Council of the National Crime Research Centre.</p> <p>As a government agency, NCRC mainly receives its funding from the National Treasury for its operations. The Centre therefore participates in Treasury's organized budgeting processes and Budget Sector Working Group meetings.</p> <p>For more information about the National Treasury, view: <a href="http://www.treasury.go.ke">http://www.treasury.go.ke</a></p>
Kenya has been reported to be a hub for drugs as well as a transit point for drugs being trafficked to countries such as South American countries, Germany and Belgium. With it comes the problem of drug abuse affecting many youths in Kenya. The complexity with which drug trafficking is managed (in terms of modes of operation and the politics involved) leaves law enforcers at a disadvantaged position.	Drug trafficking is given impetus by drug abuse which is driven by peer pressure, youth unemployment/idleness, desire for adventure, inadequate parenting, ease of access of drugs, mistreatment/stress, high poverty levels, the surrounding environment, domestic violence, inadequate information/acting on myths, media adverts, ineffective security systems, community cultural value, poor legal framework for drug prevention, depression and infiltration of western culture. Corruption and inadequately policed	

	borders and international waters are also partly to blame for the crime.	
<b>Human Trafficking</b>	<b>Human Trafficking</b>	<p><b>Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services</b></p> <p>The Ministry's membership in the Governing Council of NCRC is through the Department of Gender and Social Development.</p> <p>The Centre recently completed and launched a report on Gender Based Violence in Kenya. The report has, among others, been instrumental in the programming of the National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC).</p> <p>Through a report on Human Trafficking in Kenya, the Centre has articulated child trafficking issues which also form the core mandate of the Department of Children Services in the same Ministry.</p> <p>For more information about the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services, view: <a href="http://www.labour.go.ke">http://www.labour.go.ke</a></p>
Kenya is reported to be a source, transit and destination for men, women and children trafficked for forced labour and sexual exploitation. A Study by the National Crime Research Centre indicates that the forms of trafficking prevalent in Kenya were labour (44%) and sex related (53%) and that trafficking involves children (33%), men (26%) and women (41%).	<p>The main enablers and pathways of Human Trafficking in Kenya include: high levels of poverty and unemployment. Others are ready markets for casual labour, corruption, Illiteracy, porous border points and lack of awareness.</p> <p>Most of the victims in domestic trafficking are</p>	<p><b>NGOs Coordination Board</b></p> <p>The NGO Coordination Board is a member of the Governing Council of the National Crime Research Centre. The Board has the responsibility of regulating and enabling the NGO sector in Kenya, a sector which also plays an important role in crime prevention.</p> <p>For more information about the NGO Coordination Board, view: <a href="http://www.ngobureau.or.ke">http://www.ngobureau.or.ke</a></p>

	<p>sourced from rural areas. In external trafficking, most victims are sourced from urban areas. Other sources include institutions like schools, churches, children homes and refugee camps. Road transport is the commonly used in domestic trafficking while air is mostly used in external human trafficking. The results indicate that victims of human trafficking in external are mostly destined to the Middle East countries. In domestic human trafficking, most of the victims are destined to the urban areas.</p>	
<p><b>Maritime Piracy</b></p>	<p><b>Maritime Piracy</b></p>	<p><b>The Universities</b></p> <p>The Centre’s research benefits from expertise of scholars drawn from both public and private universities represented in the Governing Council. The purpose is to make a perfect blend of theory and practice in the policy research of the Centre.</p> <p>The Centre is working with the United States International University (USIU)-Africa and Kenya School of Government on a programme on Crime Prevention in Kwale and Bungoma County.</p> <p>For more information about the universities, view the respective websites of: USIU-Africa, Daystar University, University of Nairobi, Kenyatta University, Moi University, Jomo Kenyatta</p>

<p>This is a kind of ‘armed robbery’ committed in the seas. Until recently, Maritime Piracy had become a commonplace problem in the Indian Ocean waters.</p> <p>It has been alleged that the proceeds of Maritime Piracy have found their way into legitimate real estate and business investments in some major towns in Kenya.</p>	<p>Policing Maritime Piracy has been dubbed one of the most expensive undertakings due to the expansiveness of the waters and the resources required to police the waters. The international nature of the crime also complicates the management of the crime especially when there are uncoordinated efforts among countries addressing it (for example when others are for paying of ransom and others are not for it). Other important enablers and pathways of Maritime Piracy include: simmering conflicts between Persian Gulf states; terrorism in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India, and Saudi Arabia; insurgency in Yemen and Iraq; state failure, civil war, and famine in Somalia; and high-volume trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan via Pakistan and Iran.</p>	<p>University and Egerton University.</p> <p><b>National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC)</b></p> <p>The Centre recently completed and launched a report on Gender Based Violence in Kenya. The report has, among others, been instrumental in the programming of the National Gender and Equality Commission.</p> <p>For more information about the National Gender and Equality Commission, view: <a href="http://www.ngeckkenya.org">http://www.ngeckkenya.org</a></p>
<p><b>Cybercrime</b></p>	<p><b>Cybercrime</b></p>	<p><b>Kenya School of Government</b></p> <p>The Centre is a partner of the Kenya School of Government. Some of the Centre’s staff has taken training on Crime Prevention from the School. The Centre’s Chief Executive Officers have also facilitated urban violence and crime prevention trainings at the School.</p>

		For more information about the Kenya School of Government, view: <a href="http://www.ksg.ac.ke">http://www.ksg.ac.ke</a>
<p>Cybercrime is a criminal activity done using computers and the internet. This includes anything from downloading illegal music files to stealing millions of money/shillings from online bank accounts. Cybercrime also includes non-monetary offences, such as creating and distributing viruses on other computers or posting confidential business information on the internet.</p> <p>Cybercrime takes the form of Identity theft, Internet fraud, Copyright infringement, Cyber warfare and Computer viruses and worms.</p>	<p>The almost universal usage of modern information communication technologies such as internet and digital systems in both public and private sector offices and operations and the huge volumes of all sorts of data provide lucrative and attractive opportunities for Cybercrime. The dynamic nature of modern information communication technology and the very nature of internet's international connectivity, borderlessness and relative anonymity is an enabling factor of Cybercrime.</p>	<p><b>Council of Governors</b></p> <p>The 47 County Governments in Kenya conglomerate at the Council of Governors (CoG). On 10<sup>th</sup> March, 2016, the Centre and the Council of Governors entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to partner in crime research activities at the county level (see download on “Working Document on the Comprehensive Framework on the Administration of Justice within the Context of Devolution”). The CoG also participated in a Round Table Forum with development partners organized by NCRC on 31<sup>st</sup> March, 2016.</p> <p>For more information about the Council of Governors, view: <a href="http://www.cog.go.ke">http://www.cog.go.ke</a></p>
<b>Carjacking</b>	<b>Carjacking</b>	<p><b>Danish Demining Group (DDG)-Kenya Office</b></p> <p>The Centre has been partnering with the Danish Demining Group on research issues on conflict in large scale infrastructure projects.</p> <p>For more information about the Danish Demining Group, view: <a href="https://www.danishdemininggroup.dk">https://www.danishdemininggroup.dk</a></p>
<p>Carjacking has been reported to be one of the commonest crimes in Kenya and is committed in order to commit an armed robbery. Until recently, Nairobi was reported to witness an average of ten</p>	<p>Poverty, youth unemployment, corruption among some wayward security agents, poor road and housing infrastructure</p>	<p><b>Coffey</b></p> <p>The Centre is entering into partnership with Coffey with a view to generating research evidence-based information on issues of causes and prevention of different forms of violence, instability and conflict and inequalities as key components of crime and</p>

<p>hijackings per day. Victims of carjacking suffer variedly depending on whether or not they cooperated with the carjackers. The unfortunate thing is that Kenyan authorities have limited capacity to deter or investigate such acts.</p>	<p>development, poorly lit streets and roads, inadequate CCTV surveillance of streets, roads, residential and business premises and community apathy are some enablers of carjacking crime.</p>	<p>insecurity.</p> <p>For more information about Coffey, view: <a href="http://www.coffey.com">http://www.coffey.com</a></p>
<p><b>Kidnapping</b></p>	<p><b>Kidnapping</b></p>	<p><b>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)-Regional Office in Eastern Africa</b></p> <p>NCRC and UNODC have been close collaborators in launches of crime research reports of the two organizations. The Centre in 2015 made a presentation on “The Situation of Human Trafficking in Kenya” during a forum organized by UNODC at the Simba Lodge in Naivasha, Kenya.</p> <p>For more information about UNODC, view: <a href="https://www.unodc.org/eastern">https://www.unodc.org/eastern</a></p>
<p>The crime of kidnap is a major security problem in Kenya. A study by the National Crime Research Centre shows that the country experiences several types of kidnappings with kidnapping committed by a stranger being the most prevalent. Other types of kidnappings are: kidnapping committed by an acquaintance; being kidnapped and forced to withdraw money from an Automated Teller Machine (ATM); inside kidnapping; kidnapping committed by a family member and virtual kidnapping.</p> <p>The majority of the victims of kidnappings were found to be children and juveniles aged below 18 years. However, business</p>	<p>The enablers and pathways of kidnappings in Kenya have been found to include unemployment especially among the youth, high incidence of poverty, existence of gangs and militia, retrogressive cultural practices, instability and conflicts in some regions, inefficiency and/or corruption among some members of the security system, political competition and rivalry, marginalization of some areas, proliferation of illegal small arms and</p>	<p><b>Penal Reform International (PRI)</b></p> <p>The Centre has partnered with the UK-based Penal Reform International in a co-funded study on “The Delivery of Community Based Sentences: The Case of Community Service Orders in the Meru High Court Administrative Jurisdiction, Kenya”</p> <p>For more information about Penal Reform International, view: <a href="http://www.penalreform.org">www.penalreform.org</a></p>

<p>persons, Government Officers and tourists have also fallen victims. The majority of the kidnapers were found to be strangers, followed by acquaintances of victims, organized criminal and street gangs, romantic partners, family members and security agents.</p> <p>Kidnappings are mainly executed by groups of kidnapers who, to a large extent, also use illegal arms and weapons against their victims. Most kidnapers use force to get their victims with enticing and luring being the next popular way of executing kidnappings. Victims are mostly kidnapped when going home, with others being kidnapped when on duty or business premises or when closing business.</p>	<p>light weapons and competition for control of resources.</p>	
<p><b>Confidence Tricks</b></p>	<p><b>Confidence Tricks</b></p>	<p><b>The Usalama Reforms Forum</b></p> <p>NCRC and the Usalama Reforms Forum have been close allies in their activities. The Centre was recently involved in Usalama’s launch of a report on “Strengthening Institutional Engagement and Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya-Pilot Project”. Usalama also participated in a Round Table Forum with development partners organized by NCRC on 31<sup>st</sup> March, 2016.</p> <p>For more information about Usalama Reforms Forum, view: <a href="http://www.usalamaforum.org">www.usalamaforum.org</a></p>
<p>This is probably the most common form of crime in Kenya. Confidence tricksters and other people may play on the emotions and ignorance of others to achieve what they want. They use various tricks, among them</p>	<p>Enablers of Confidence Tricks crimes include: poverty, greed for quick wealth, selfish and unscrupulous religious and</p>	

claiming to recognize you from someplace where at a certain point in your interaction, they will ask for some money in some way. Another trick is to create feelings of friendship, give you some present, and then emotionally blackmail you into giving something (e.g cash) in return. Kenyans were a few years ago tricked with making huge returns from their cash investments and lost billions of shillings during the Pyramid Schemes scam, some orchestrated by religious and other community leaders.

community leaders who abuse trust bestowed on them by their followers and ignorance of the victims.

**Poaching**

**Poaching**

Poaching is one of the most common forms of environmental crime in Kenya. The spate of killings of especially elephants threatens Kenya’s valuable tourism industry, which is the second largest foreign exchange earner after agriculture.

Prosecution and sentencing of poaching cases has been criticized as deficient. A Kenyan conservation campaign group found that just 4% of those convicted of wildlife crime in the past spent time in jail. Therefore, poachers have little fear of tough new laws designed to stem the wave of killings of wildlife.

Poaching is driven by: poverty, weak law enforcement where elephants live, corruption and by illegal market demand especially in China. Kenyan officials once placed much of the blame for the surge in poaching on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (Cites), which in 2008 allowed Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and South Africa to sell a total of 108 tonnes of ivory to China and Japan.

Illegal dealers of game trophies have been intercepted at airports and the ocean while poachers

have taken utilized elephant migration routes and areas linking with water holes and fresh foliage in their poaching activities.

## **Organized Criminal Groups**

In 2011-2012, NCRC conducted a study on Organized Criminal Gangs in Kenya. Profiles of six organized criminal gangs namely Mombasa Republican Council, Mungiki, The 42 Brothers, Angola Msumbiji, Al Shabaab and Sungu Sungu are captured below as Case studies while general information on all the criminal gangs is presented in a Table.

### **1. Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)**

#### **Origin**

The group is based in the coastal region of Kenya and is associated with the Mijikenda community. This organization is among the thirty three groups outlawed by the government in 2010 through a gazette notice No. 12585 of 18<sup>th</sup> October 2010.

One of the group's ideologies is fighting for secession of the Coast region using agreements between the colonial government and Sultan of Zanzibar as a reason for their wanting to break away. The group has filed a case in the High Court of Mombasa to have its name removed from the gazette notice. Dozens of people suspected to be members of the group have been arrested and charged with various offenses like engaging in criminal activities of which most of them are pending in court.

The other big issue the group has raised is land ownership where they accuse non-Mijikenda community to legally own land while the indigenous do not as they have no title deeds. Politics do not feature prominently but information received is that politicians support the group's ideologies so as to gain political support in future. Members registered themselves with MRC and of late they have endeavored to reach out to most of the Mijikenda communities living in the Coast. Other activities include oath taking for newly recruited members so as to adhere to the rules of the group.

#### **Activities**

It was established that the group holds meetings at night to recruit members. It is through the same meetings that the group too collects funds to facilitate its operations. Threat of eviction of people, destruction of voters' cards, promoting hatred, murder, threats of secession and extortion are

some of the criminal activities carried out by the group. It is not possible to approximate the average annual income of the group over the last three years from illicit and other activities.

### **Organized Crime and Law Enforcement**

It was established that in the last 3 years, arrests had been made though the exact number of the arrested was unknown. The reasons why these arrests were made are varied. Respondents indicated that members of the group were arrested due to taking part in an illegal gathering, being a member of an organized criminal group and taking oaths. Further, there have been prosecutions of the arrested members for the aforementioned offences. However, there has been no conviction of the arrested members and it is not clear why this is the case. Respondents disagreed with the observation that the group is successful in providing security for group members against law enforcement. For example, many group members are frequently arrested and released. So far no collusion between the MRC members and police is known which partly explains the frequency of arrests and prosecution which has also destabilized the MRC to a considerable extent.

### **Structure**

The organization has a chairman, secretary and treasurer whose identities are within public knowledge.

### **Ethnic and Gender Composition**

Members of the group are Kenyans. On ethnic dimension, it was established that MRC comprises members of the wider Mijikenda, Swahili, Pokomo and Taita. Others belong to upcountry ethnic groups which have lived in the Coast region for long. However, they were reported to be a minority. The MRC enjoys strong and wide ethnic support. This is demonstrated by the vigour with which coastal leaders come to their defence whenever they are arrested. Even though Muslims and Christians in Coastal region often have their differences and suspicions, they seem to have a common ground regarding MRC. So far women have not been reported to be members.

### **Size**

It was not possible to establish the current size of the group due to its clandestine operations. The group has a known overall leader, officials and the rank and file.

### **Funding**

Two main sources of funding were established. These were membership contributions and donations from some wealthy individuals of Arab origin.

### **Violence**

The group intermittently uses violence to achieve its objectives. The group does not use violence against other organized crime groups to conquer, or defend illegal Market, to solve payment problems or as a result of bad deals. It was not clear how many business people, police officers and government officials were killed by the group in the last 3 years. The group works as an underground movement, perhaps the reason why it is not known whether its activities are violent or not.

### **Professionalism of the MRC**

The professional aspect of MRC is appreciable. It was observed that the group uses professionals such as lawyers. However, the continued use and reliance on magicians for oathing and blessing to be immune to arrest casts doubt on the group's professionalism. The group is not effective in terms of its ability to leave few or no traces of its activities. However, respondents observed that the group is not effective in changing from one profitable illegal activity to another.

### **General Influence of the Gang**

The group is influential and appealing to the entire Coastal population. However, cases of influence on the police, media, political process and judicial system remain unclear. Its rallying call is the alleged dispossession of Coastal people and seeking an independent state from Kenya. That call appeals to people and in the process the group becomes influential. The civil society in Coast region too has been influenced by this group. The group does have an identifiable geographical base where its operations are concentrated, namely Kwale, Likoni, Mombasa, Changamwe, Kisauni. These are the hotspots where its influence is strongest.

### **Political Influence**

Respondents' views on the political influence of the group were sought. Respondents disagreed with the observation that the group is able to manipulate politicians and the political process in the region. Similar observations were made with regard to the group's ability to manipulate politicians and the political process abroad.

On whether the group is able to channel funds to the election campaigns, respondents disagreed with the observation. The group has not managed to get group members elected to parliament. Further, the respondents agreed with the claims that the group has managed to influence coverage or non-coverage of certain issues in the public media. For example newspapers/magazines that report news about the Coastal region always carry reports about this group. Religious leaders frequently talk in support of this group. The group had no trace of support for political terrorism at home or abroad. However, since the group is largely made up of the youth its potential to influence the politics remains high in the foreseeable future.

### **Trans-border Operations**

Although the government's position on the group is that MRC is an outlawed group with links to Al Shabaab, various informants indicate that the group has no such external links. Respondents observed that the group does not have networks in other countries nor does it procure its goods/merchandise from another country. The group does not launder money abroad neither does it work with other organized crime groups in other countries. The group does not receive support from foreign governments and/or armed groups.

### **Role of the Group in Legitimate Economy**

There was no evidence that the group had penetrated the legitimate economy in the area and also in foreign countries. It was also observed that the group had no economic partnerships with criminal and legitimate actors in the area and in foreign countries. As such, respondents could not identify the value of its total assets invested in the legal national economy in the area and abroad. Also, respondents were not clear on what

percentage of the group's income that is not used for paying operating expense and salaries.

**MRC Statistics**

<b>Type of organized group</b>	<b>Tribe of offender(s)</b>	<b>Area/Region</b>	<b>Offences</b>	<b>Number of cases</b>	<b>Position of case</b>
Mombasa Republican Council	Digo, Giriama, Chonyi, Duruma, Teso, Kambe, Bajun, Arab, Swahili	Coast Province (Mombasa, Kilifi, Kwale)	Engaging in organized criminal activities, taking part in unlawful assembly	13	2 cases acquitted under Section 210 CPC 11 Pending Before Court (PBC)

Source: Directorate of Intelligence Service, Nairobi, 2011

## 2. Mungiki

### Origin

Mungiki is coined from *muingi*, a Kikuyu word meaning people and *Ki* meaning multitude or large gathering. The name is believed to have been invented by one Muturi wa Mathenge in the year about 1980 who hailed from Charagita Village in Nyandarua District. The sect, as the name suggests is associated with Kikuyu community whose adherents and supporters propagate going back to their cultural and political roots. The sect also attached themselves with number 3 which is  $3 \times 3$  giving 9 which represents the nine communities forming the Gikuyu community..The peaks of Mt. Kenya are believed to be the domicile of their God, *Ngai*. The sect's membership fee is KShs.3. The nine (9) symbolizes wealth which they called *iria nyama na uki*. Ritual performance is associated with the group on recruitment which is done in secrecy.

One Kamunya Njoroge, father of the renowned leader Maina Njenga, was believed to be the sect's spiritual leader. He founded and sold the ideology of the sect in about the year 1998. Under the leadership of Maina Njenga, the son of the founder, the sect started imposing its beliefs onto the members of the community as they wanted recognition and identity. The followers were also associated with dreadlocks, tobacco sniffing, among other things. During this time, most of the unemployed youths from the community joined the sect and later grouped to criminal gangs due to economic difficulties which led them to illegal activities to sustain their livelihood. The group has since been associated with major crimes like creating fear and terror, murder, unlawful curfews, extortions and kidnappings.

The group is located within Nairobi County, Central Kenya and parts of Rift Valley. Though with the law on organized crimes, the group, like any other, has gone down and the activities are not prominent though the impact of Maina Njenga detaching himself from the group could be felt. They may still be extorting from matatus and contractors as most of them man bus termini and have also engaged themselves in legitimate businesses.

### Activities

It was established that the group engages in extortion and ethnic violence in many parts of the country. In urban slums, residents pay a variable sum of money to the organization, in exchange for protection against theft and property damage. In addition, the gang "mans" public toilets, and charges a fee for use of the facilities.

Other illegal activities that the group engages in include:

- Levies on business people
- Extortion of money from the transport sector
- Illegal power connections
- Illegal water connections

- Threatening/instilling fear among the public
- Extortion from bereaved members of the public
- Beheading (e.g. as enumerated in the Daily Nation 12<sup>th</sup> March, 2009)
- Torture of seemingly reformed sect members
- Occasional forced female circumcision
- Charging farmers on farm produce sold or any gifts received including dowry
- Kidnapping
- Robbery with violence

None of these activities was reportedly mentioned as being dominant to others. It was also not clear how much the group makes annually from the above activities although it is a considerable amount of money.

### **Organized Crime and Law Enforcement**

The review of literature indicated that the group was outlawed in 2002. The crackdown on members followed thereafter. Due to this, group members have previously clashed with law enforcement agencies and arrests of members have been reported. This was confirmed in the survey. Respondents noted that part of the reasons why the members were arrested include administration of illegal oaths and taking part in illegal gatherings. Prosecutions of the members have been made previously; a case in point is its leader who served a jail-term. However, some of those arrested have been set free due to lack of evidence that they were taking part in illegal activities. The relationship between Mungiki and police has been both friendly and unfriendly. In urban areas in particular the relationship has often fluctuated. However, the relationship has improved between them since about 2006 for no arrests have ever been reported since then even though the group remains active.

### **Structure**

Mungiki has a national leader, section heads, area heads, executioners and foot soldiers and a clear reporting and hierarchical structure.

### **Ethnic and Gender Composition of the Gang**

It was established that members of the group are Kenyans. The main ethnic group represented in Mungiki is about 90% Kikuyu. The remaining 10% comprises of the Embu and Meru. On gender composition, it was estimated that 80% of the group's members are male while female are represented by the remaining 20%. Elderly people are active members and supporters.

### **Size**

It was not possible to establish the current size of the group due to its clandestine operations and the members are not registered. Estimates show it has about 3 million members.

### **Funding**

Most of the group's funds are obtained from illegal collections on PSV, other transporters, business people, households, contractors, developers,

illegal power and water connections.

### **Violence**

It is a known fact that Mungiki uses violence internally and externally. This confirms the claims that the group's factional fighting has led to weakening of the group in some areas where it operates. This has also resulted to killings of its top leaders in what is believed to be the struggle over the control of its massive resources. Violence has also been meted out on members of public, mainly those who are perceived to be informers or refuse to cooperate. No police officer or government official was reported to have been killed by members of the group in the last 3 years but they have previously murdered police officers and chiefs.

It was found out that the group makes use of violence against other organized crime groups to conquer or defend illegal market or to solve payment problems as a result of bad deals. For instance Mungiki, Taliban and Kamjeshi have often had fights between themselves in Dandora, Kariobangi, Huruma and Korogocho. Mungiki has also fought vigilante groups in Kirinyaga area. This group is the most violent compared to the other groups that were studied.

### **Professionalism of the Gang**

The professional aspect of Mungiki is unclear. Respondents were not sure whether the group acts with some level of professionalism or whether it works with skilled persons and sophisticated management structures. However, they agreed that the group is effective in terms of its ability to leave few or no traces of its activities. The survey also established that the group is effective in changing from one profitable illegal activity to another based on changing risks and profits. The group uses lawyers to defend its members in court.

### **General Influence of the Gang**

Mungiki is an influential outfit. The group manages to influence other persons with money including the police and the political class. Its network with and influence on the judicial system, administration, law enforcement, media and political process was noted. The group effectively operates in and outside the prisons. The group also influences the conduct of businesses especially public transport, construction and retail in areas they operate.

### **Political Influence of the Gang**

The study established that the group is able to manipulate politicians and the political process in the areas they operate. However, it was revealed that the group is unable to manipulate politicians and political process abroad. The group is able to channel funds to election campaigns. Respondents confirmed that the group has managed to get group members/supporters elected to parliament. The group manages to influence coverage or non-coverage of certain issues in the public media. The group supports political terrorism in the country but not abroad.

### Trans-border operations

The group has no known network in other countries. It was not possible to establish whether Mungiki launders money abroad, cooperates with other groups abroad or at home and whether it gets support from foreign governments or armed groups.

### The Role of the Group in Legitimate Economy

The survey established that the group has penetrated the legitimate economy in Kenya. It was established that it had not penetrated the legitimate economy of foreign countries. The transport industry, retail business, scrap metal, real estate were identified as the main sectors of the economy the group has penetrated. It was not possible to identify the percentage of total assets the group had invested in the legal national economy. Also, respondents were not clear on what percentage of the group's income is used for paying operating expenses and salaries.

### Political Affiliation

During the 2002 general elections, Mungiki supported KANU. In 2007 the group supported the Party of National Unity (PNU).

### Statistics on cases in the last three years

Type of organized group	Tribe of offender(s)	Area/Region	Offences	Number of cases	Position of case	Remarks
Mungiki	Kikuyu, Meru, Kamba, Luhya, Embu, Luo, Borana	Nairobi	Touting, engaging in organized criminal activity, illegal collection, being a member of unlawful sect, taking unlawful oath, kidnapping	92	16 finalized 76 PBC	Most of the finalized cases are those were charged with touting of which the accused persons were either fined or had suspended sentence
Mungiki	Kikuyu	Central	Preparation to administer unlawful oath, touting, possession of bhang, robbery, preparation to commit a felony	277	2PBC 2 withdrawal 273 finalized	Nearly all accused persons were charged with touting and most of them were fined
Mungiki	Kikuyu, Kamba, Meru,	Rift Valley	Demanding money by written threats, engaging in organized	6	I acquittal	

	Luo		criminal activity		11 withdrawal 4 PBC	
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**Source: Directorate of Criminal Investigation, Nairobi, 2011**

### **3. The 42 Brothers**

#### **Origin**

This is the largest of the organized criminal gangs in the country. It is found in most parts of the country. It derives its name from the forty two tribes of Kenya as being all brothers. It emerged in the 1970's.

#### **Activities**

The study established that the group engages in the following activities:

- Drug trafficking
- Drug planting
- Money laundering
- Armed robbery
- Trafficking in women/children for the sex industry
- Illegal activities surrounding prostitution
- Kidnapping for ransom
- Extortion, including protection money

Of these activities, extortion (including protection money) and kidnapping for ransom were identified as the dominant activities undertaken by the group. The estimated annual income of the group from both licit and illicit activities was however, not known.

#### **Organized Crime and Law Enforcement**

It was established that arrests of the group members had been made in the last 3 years and prosecutions made. The number of prosecutions, convictions or even reasons for failure to convict could, however, not be established.

#### **Structure**

The group has a national leader with cell leaders across the country. Currently the leader is believed to be stationed in Western Region round Luanda, Maseno and Emusire areas.

#### **Ethnic and Gender Composition of the Gang**

It was established that the group derives its membership from Kenyans. The main ethnic group making up the group is the Luhya, and to a lesser extent, Luo. The group however enjoys relative support from the Luhya of Vihiga though it has presence in many parts of the country. The exact or even estimated gender composition of the group was estimated at 10% female.

**Size**

It was not possible to establish the current size of the group due to its clandestine operations owing to the fact that it is an illegal outfit. The group is too large and most widespread across the country to be able to know its size.

**Funding**

The group generates its funds from sale of drugs, especially bhang, obtained in Western Kenya. Proceeds from criminal activities such as theft and support from business people are other sources.

**Violence of the Gang**

Respondents agreed that the group uses violence. There is an internal use of violence within the group. The group also makes use of violence against other organized crime groups to conquer or defend illegal market, to solve payment problems or as a result of bad deals. It was not established, however, whether the group members had been arrested or imprisoned in the last three years since it has gone relatively underground.

**Professionalism of the Gang**

It was observed that The 42 Brothers has no professionalism in its activities because most members are of low education. Further, respondents noted that the group is effective in terms of its ability to leave few or no traces of its activities. The group effectively uses legal services whenever the members are arrested. The survey also established that the group is effective in changing from one profitable illegal activity to another based on changing risks and profits.

**General Influence of the Gang**

The 42 Brothers is an influential group. The group manages to influence persons with money. However, the number of police and judicial corruption cases associated with the group 3 years preceding the survey was not established. Respondents observed that the group is the most effective in operating in and out of prison. Of all arrested and convicted members of organized crime, this gang has the highest number of members in prison. The group's influence was reported to transcend the civil service and armed forces because it manages to pay its way to get its members recruited annually.

**Political Influence of the Gang**

The study established that the group is able to manipulate politicians and the political process in the region. However, respondents were not sure whether the group is able to manipulate politicians and political process abroad. They were however not sure of the allegations that the group manages to influence coverage or non-coverage of certain issues in the public media. The group members are usually hired by politicians as body guards during political campaigns and in the process able to influence the political process.

**Transnational Links of the Gang**

It was not established whether the group's network operates in several other countries. Respondents could not establish whether The 42 Brothers

launders money abroad, cooperates with other groups abroad or at home and whether it gets support from foreign governments or armed groups. The consensus however was that the group has no transnational links.

### **The Role of the Group in Legitimate Economy**

The survey established that the group has penetrated into the legitimate economy in its area of operation, especially transport, retail and scrap metal. It is clear the group has not penetrated into the legitimate economy of foreign countries. There was no evidence of economic partnerships between criminal and legitimate actors in the areas they operate.

The value of total assets the group had invested in the legal national economy cannot be determined. It is also not clear the amount of the group's income that is used for operations. Respondents observed that the group has been destabilized as many of its members had been prosecuted before while others had cases pending in courts.

### **General Characteristics of the Gang**

The study established that the identifiable geographical base of the group is Vihiga County, Emuhaya, Luanda and Kangemi in Nairobi. The area is conducive for the operational base of the group due to its ethnic composition that makes recruitment of members easy. Informants were sure that the group presently obtains little voluntary support from its social/ethnic constituency. It was also found out that the group is successful in providing security for group members against law enforcement. The group supports and offers legal assistance to arrested or imprisoned group members. It was not clear whether the group is successful in providing social security for family members and other dependants of imprisoned/killed group members. The group has a known overall leader and several regional heads hence it is highly structured.

### **The 42 Brothers Statistics**

<b>Type of organized group</b>	<b>Tribe of offender(s)</b>	<b>Area/Region</b>	<b>offences</b>	<b>Number of cases</b>	<b>Position of case</b>
The 42 Brothers	Luhya,	Western (Vihiga, Emuhaya)	Robbery	2	PBC

Source: Directorate of Criminal Investigation, Nairobi, 2011

## **4. Angola Msumbiji**

### **Origin**

This is one of the oldest organized criminal gangs known in the country. It started around 1970 in Mwhila area of Khwisero. It got its name from the rebel groups that were fighting the Angola and Mozambique governments. Initially they were independent groups but merged after the serious fight following disagreements over supporting different primary schools football teams at Emubole Primary school in Kisa North. When none of

them won the fight, they decided to merge into one. Initially they were using bicycles christened “Country Bus” as their identification mark but when their activities became prominent they discontinued that trademark. The main sponsor was identified as the late Mr. Pandi Makuyuku and later a Mr. Abudo of the family of Seif Abudo. Seif Abudo was an Indian who owned a jaggery business at Khwisero. He allegedly sponsored this group for security and to scare off potential business rivals.

### **Activities**

The following were identified as the dominant activities conducted by the group:

- Armed robbery
- Burglary
- Murder
- Rape
- Stock theft
- Forgery of government documents

The estimated annual income of the group from both licit and illicit activities was, however, not known.

### **Organized Crime and Law Enforcement**

Respondents were aware of arrests, prosecutions and convictions of the group members made in the 3 years preceding the survey. The convictions were too few because the group is very organized in bailing out the members, covering or withholding evidence and bribing the law enforcement, administrative and judicial officers.

### **Structure**

The group has a leader who is referred to as Commander and hails from Butere. The group adopted the structure of the armed forces from the top to the lower levels.

### **Ethnic and Gender Composition of the Gang**

The group derives its membership from the Luhya particularly Kisa, Marama, Idakho and Banyore. The estimated gender composition of the group was about 10% female. Its use of women in its operations is very sophisticated. Women play the role of spying and duping unsuspecting victims with night requests for assistance. Children of Angola - Msumbiji members are also socialized into crime at an early age and are used to open doors or passed through very narrow openings to enter houses to unbolt doors or windows from inside. Women also use hens to dupe house owners to open doors for the group to get in.

### **Size**

The exact size of the group is not known but it is large.

### **Funding**

The group obtains most of its funds from robbery and violence, cattle rustling, operating butcheries and protection fees from business people and politicians.

### **Violence of the Gang**

The group is known for violence whether the victim cooperates or not. The group does not use violence against its members because it is a closely knit organization. Members do not for instance desert once they join. It was not, however, possible to establish the number of police officers killed by the group in the last three years. However, there had been repeated use of violence by the group against members of the public in the last three years. As the food shortages of early and mid 2011 persisted the group resurrected.

### **Professionalism of the Gang**

It was observed that Angola Msumbiji acts with professionalism. The group's use of legal services was noted whenever its members were arrested. However, the group also uses unprofessional means to get its work done. For example, it uses clothes retrieved from a corpse which they burn and scatter the ash in the house of the intended victim. This is believed to make the victim sleep soundly as they ransack the house unnoticed. They also use a rope used by a suicide victim, tie it across the door of the intended victim. That is believed to send the person into deep sleep. Once in the house they can prepare food, slaughter chicken, cook and eat before they leave with their booty. Further, respondents noted that the group is effective in terms of its ability to leave few or no traces of its activities. The survey also established that the group is effective in changing from one profitable illegal activity to another based on changing risks and benefits.

### **General Influence of the Gang**

It was found out that Angola - Msumbiji is an influential outfit; it manages to influence other persons with money. It influences politics, the conduct of business, assets people have and how local leaders govern.

### **Political Influence of the Gang**

Politicians have used this group successfully in the past. Therefore its influence in politics is felt. Although the group does not channel funds to elections, its support for a politician is important. Previously they elected their supporters to parliament. Given its rural focus the group is not able to influence the national media. The group does not have political links in other countries as well.

### **Transnational Links of the Gang**

The group is not known to have any links in other countries. It does not equally launder money or receive any other form of support from another country or external group.

### **Role of the Gang in the Legitimate Economy**

The group has penetrated the formal economy. The group is engaged in livestock trade, butchery business, motorcycle business and public

transport. The group has strong connections with butchery owners. It was not possible to identify the value of the group's total assets invested in the legal national economy in the area. It could not be established the value of the group's income that is used for paying operational expenses.

### **General Characteristics of the Gang**

The identifiable geographical base of the group is Khwisero and Butere. The group obtains both voluntary and involuntary support from the ethnic group. It is able to extract involuntary support since it is dreaded. It was also found out that the group is successful in providing security for group members against law enforcement. Respondents also observed that the group is successful in providing support and assistance (including legal) to arrested or imprisoned group members. Similar observations were recorded with regard to the group's success in providing social security for family members and other dependants of imprisoned/killed group members. For example the group is known for paying instant court fines for its convicted members. The group is very organized in its attacks. Sometimes it sends a letter in advance to the person they intend to rob to prepare for their coming. The group also organizes stock theft, their transportation and slaughter.

## **5. Al Shabaab**

### **Origin**

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM) means Youth Movement or "*Movement of Striving Youth*), more commonly known as al-Shabaab. "*The Youth*", *The Boys*, or "*The Lads*". It is a terrorist group of militants fighting to overthrow the government of Somalia. As of 2011, the group controlled large swathes of the southern parts of Somalia, where it is said to have imposed its own strict form of *Sharia* law. Al Shabaab's troop strength as of May 2011 was estimated at 14,426 militants. The group is an off shoot of the Islamic Courts Union, which splintered into several smaller organizations after its removal from power by Ethiopian forces in 2006. It describes itself as waging jihad against "enemies of Islam", and is engaged in combat against the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Al Shabaab members, alleging ulterior motives on the part of foreign organization, also reportedly intimidated, kidnapped and killed aid workers, leading to a suspension of humanitarian operations and an exodus of relief agents. The group has been designated a terrorist organization by several western governments and security services. It has also been described in *The New Yorker* as having "ties to Al Qaeda," which its leaders denied until early 2010.

In Kenya the organization is believed to be found in Nairobi Eastleigh, North Eastern and Coast regions. Information has it that the group has many training camps in Somalia and it has spread to Kenya where youths have been lured and trained to be the fighters of the group.

For a considerable time youths from Nairobi, Eastern, Coast and North Eastern regions have been disappearing and suspected to have gone to Somalia to receive military training from Al Shabaab. They are enticed with money and radical Islamic teachings which glorify Jihad, "the act of fighting war against enemies of Islam".

Information obtained from an official from Anti Terrorism Police Unit is that women have been identified to be recruiters of youths to join Al-Shabaab and that youths recruited and indoctrinated do not necessarily come from communities which profess Islam faith. It is nowadays spreading

to larger population of Kenya and the youth are not easily suspected even if found in the northern frontier districts.

### **Activities**

The study established that the group engages in the following criminal activities:

- Money laundering and forgery
- Dealing in contraband
- Terrorism
- Vehicle theft and trafficking
- Illegal immigration/human trafficking
- Kidnapping for ransom
- Illegal levies on businesses
- Extortion, including protection money.
- Firearms (smuggling for profit)
- Firearms (smuggling for political struggle)
- Explosives (illegal traffic)
- Piracy

Of these activities, firearms (smuggling for profit), kidnapping for ransom and human trafficking are the dominant activities undertaken by the group. The estimated annual income of the group from both licit and illicit activities was however not known.

### **Organized Crime and Law Enforcement**

Members of this organization have been arrested but it is not known what happens to them thereafter because no known convictions have been made. The relationship between Al Shabaab and law enforcement is not collegial.

### **Structure**

The group has a foreign leader but in Kenya its structure is not clearly known although there are believed to be several leaders.

### **Ethnic and Gender Composition of the Gang**

It was established that the group derives its membership from the Somalia ethnic group who comprise about 95%. The Coastal communities, the Kikuyu and Luo have also joined. It was estimated that 100% of the members are male. This is because of the Muslim faith they profess which lays the foundation that does not allow women to be in the forefront in war paths. The group derives strong support from the Somalia. This is demonstrated by the fact that whenever its members are arrested, members of the public in Garissa, Wajir or Mandera hold demonstrations to oppose the arrests.

## **Size**

The size of Al-Shabaab is difficult to gauge but has been estimated to be over 14,000 militants. When the geographical spread is taken into consideration, the number can only be higher because of its links with other criminal groups like Al-Qaeda. It is believed that they get foreign support from Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan and Eritrea.

## **Funding**

Al-Shabaab gets most of the funds from:

1. International organizations (e.g. Al-Qaeda)
2. Wealthy individuals e.g. those in business and those running *hawala* (Informal money transfer system)
3. Sympathizers from the Diaspora.
4. Own sources got from illegal activities like ransoms from piracy and kidnaps/abduction, their own established business.

## **Violence of the Gang**

There is internal use of violence within the group against errant members or those who defect. The group also uses violence against those who oppose its cause.

## **Professionalism of the Gang**

The group is quite professional. It uses legal services and has experts trained in information technology, forgery of government documents and production of counterfeits.

## **General Influence of the Gang**

The respondents strongly agreed that Al Shabaab is an influential group. The group manages to influence many people irrespective of their social class. It is particularly influential among the youth given its attractive message and money.

## **Political Influence of the Gang**

The study established that the group is able to manipulate politicians and the political process in the country and abroad. It has ability and means to channel funds to political campaigns. However, no known member has been elected to parliament during the 2007 national elections. So far the group is not yet able to influence coverage or non coverage of its issues in the media. It is known that the group supports political terrorism at home and abroad.

## **Transnational Links of the Gang**

It was established, with strong assertion, that the group's network operates in several other countries. Some of these countries (in declining order of importance) include Somalia, Eritrea, Yemen and Uganda. The group procures its goods such as guns and ammunitions from Somalia and Eritrea. It receives laundered money from abroad. The group has links with other organized crime groups abroad, mainly Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Afghanistan,

Pakistan and Iraq.

### **Role of the Group in Legitimate Economy**

The survey established that the group has penetrated the legitimate economy in its area of operation and beyond the economy of foreign countries. There are economic partnerships between Al Shabaab and legitimate actors in Kenya and abroad. The value of its total assets could not be established. The group has diverse interests in public transport, real estate, procurement and supplies, electronics, household goods, banking and textile. In Kenya, Eastleigh is the main business hub for the group.

### **General Characteristics of the Gang**

The group presently obtains voluntary support from its social/ethnic constituency. It was also found out that the group is successful in providing security for group members against law enforcement. The group is successful in providing support and assistance (including legal) to arrested or imprisoned group members. The group provides security for family members and other dependents of imprisoned/killed group members. The group's main base is in Somalia and Eritrea but in Kenya there only operates a small cell.

### **Al Shabaab Statistics**

<b>Type of organized group</b>	<b>Tribe of offender(s)</b>	<b>Area/Region</b>	<b>Offences</b>	<b>Number of cases</b>	<b>Position of case</b>
Al- Shabaab	Kikuyu, Luhya,	Nairobi	Engaging in organized criminal activity and possession of firearms and ammos	1	PBC
Al- Shabaab	Somalia	Garissa-Daadab	Engaging in criminal activities	1	PBC

## 6. Sungu Sungu

### Origin

It is a product of the vigilante group that was started by government in Kisii. The word *Sungu Sungu* means “dreaded ant” which is very painful whenever it bites one. The group began in 2003 in Suneka Nyamira, Asumbi and Tabaka area but it has spread to all areas of the Gusii land due to the radical changes it has initiated. It developed out of indigenous organization for defense, controlling theft, particularly cattle raiding along borders of Gusii land and Maasai of the then Trans Mara and Kuria districts. It was a community response to crime but later on assumed a criminal dimension.

Local definition of crime, trial and punishment were developed, distinct from those embodied in the national penal code. Guarding its independence, the group has kept its distance from the police and the judiciary so as to avoid the systemic corruption of its institution. In distancing itself from the more corrupt agents of the state, and acting against it within its areas of operation, the group has had far-reaching effects on local security, to the extent that the success holds out possibilities for them to extend their activities into other spheres.

There seems to be no clear distinction between sungu sungu activities and community policing. While community policing entails an approach that seeks actively to prevent, detect crime, reduce fear and improve communication between the community and the police, what is taking place currently in Gusii land is a serious perpetration of crimes and human rights violations by Sungu Sungu under the guise of community policing.

### Activities

The study established that the group engages in the following activities:

- They arrest, carry out investigations, detain suspects in illegal holding cells and pass judgments in kangaroo courts
- They cause fear and terror to the community especially where they are used to threaten those who are known to be criminals
- They torture victims causing assault and grievous bodily harm
- Extortion of money from members of the public in the name of security, protection fees. Members of the public including businessmen and households contribute between Kshs.30-150 monthly.
- They carry out parallel justice system resolving domestic disputes, pass judgments, administer corporal punishments and “discipline” those who have passed through court/penal institutions and have been acquitted. An example is a case where a councilor was acquitted by a court and he was immediately hacked to death outside the precincts of the Kisii Court.
- They are used as debt collectors where they use force/threats.
- They engage in ongoing land disputes, intimidate and favour one side which borders more on corruption.
- Labour racketeering. Any casual work offered by any member of the community at individual capacity is done by them on demand. This is

prominent in the area of Nyamira and Keroka.

The estimated annual income of the group from both licit and illicit activities was, however, not known.

### **Organized Crime and Law Enforcement**

It was established that no arrests of the group members had been made in the last 3 years preceding the survey. The number of prosecutions, convictions or even reasons for failure to convict could also not be established. The group enjoys enormous government support including being accompanied by police when they go on murderous missions.

### **Structure**

The group has a chairman in charge of all the districts in larger Kisii. Each district has a leader who reports to the overall. The group adopts the government administrative structure from district to village level.

### **Ethnic and Gender Composition of the Gang**

The main ethnic group making up Sungu Sungu is the Kisii most of whom strongly support it morally, financially and materially. All members (100%) are male. The group enjoys strong community support especially following the decline in crime which had become unmanageable following alleged police failure to control it.

### **Size**

The exact size of the group is currently unknown but it is large.

### **Funding**

- Illegal levies from members of the public and businessmen
- Corruption
- Provincial administration and other security agencies

### **Violence of the Gang**

The group uses violence on alleged criminals and/or traitors. Many alleged offenders have been tortured and murdered. It has a very strong revenge posture.

### **Professionalism of the Gang**

The group is not known to use professionals because its activities are localized and the members not arrested.

### **General Influence of the Gang**

The group is very influential from household, community and at Kisii County level. It influences the daily conduct of people, how to conduct business, the do's and don'ts as well as politics.

**Political Influence of the Gang**

The group has wide political influence and most politicians from Kisii County support it and receive its support. It would be suicidal for a politician to oppose it or refuse its support. To a great extent it determines who gets elected or not elected to parliament or local authority.

**Transnational Links of the Gang**

No foreign links for this group were established.

**Role of the Group in Legitimate Economy**

The group has many interests and businesses in public transport, retail and real estate, hence it has deeply penetrated the formal economy. The group members also own motorcycles which they use for public service transport.

**General Characteristics of the Gang**

The group has a known overall leader. Each region has its leader who reports to the overall leader. The group works with the provincial administration and the police. They support each other and know the operations of each other. In each village there are informers who pass information to the regional head. That information is passed on to the overall leader. It has departments including investigations, execution squad and an executioner.

**Identified Organized Criminal gangs**

No.	Name of Criminal Gang	Principal area of operation	Main type of activities (including criminal activities)
1.	Mungiki	Central region, Nairobi	Extortion, illegal levies, violence, hire for revenge, executions, illegal oathing.
2.	Sungu Sungu	Kisii, Nyamira	Expulsion of offenders, hire for revenge, body guards, security, settlement of disputes, executions, illegal detention.
3.	Mombasa Republican Council	Kwale, Ukunda, Mombasa, Kilifi	Illegal oathing, violence, promoting hatred, extortion, threats of eviction, secession.

4.	Jeshi La Embakasi	Embakasi Constituency	Hire by politicians for illegal activities
5.	42 Brothers	Emuhaya, Ebukasami, Luanda, Maseno	Burglary, drugs, theft, violence, murder, hire as body guards, extortion
6.	Al Shabaab	Eastleigh, North Eastern	Human trafficking, trafficking of weapons, violence, maritime piracy
7.	Kamjeshi	Nairobi Eastlands	Extortion of businesses, public service transport
8.	Jeshi La Mzee	Kangemi	Hire by politicians as body guards campaigners
9.	Baghdad Boys	Kisumu	Extortion, hire by politicians, body guards, campaigners
10.	Angola Msumbiji	Butere, Khwisero	Cattle rustling, burglary, murder, hire by businessmen/politicians for protection or intimidation of opponents
11.	Taliban	Central, Kayole, Dandora	Extortion, illegal levies, murder, hire by politicians
12.	Kenya Youth Alliance	Nairobi	Burglary, extortion
13.	Shigololi	Emuhaya	Robbery, burglary
14.	Sabaot Land Defence Force	Mt. Elgon	Murder, extortions, evictions
15.	Kamukunji Boys	Kamukunji-Nairobi	Hire by politicians for campaign and body guards
16.	Munyiipi	Mathare	Extortion
17.	Damy	Dalas (Mombasa)	Burglary, robbery
18.	Funga File	Mombasa	Burglary, theft

19.	Congo By Force	Kisauni	Burglary, pick pocketing
20.	Kaya Bombo	Kwale, Kilifi	Eviction, extortion
21.	Tia Nazi	Kilifi	Burglary, extortion
22.	Sri Lanka	Kisii, Kisumu	Robbery, burglary
23.	Nuyuki	Mombasa	Burglary
24.	Charo Shutu	Malindi	Robbery, burglary
25.	Kimya	Mombasa	Burglary, extortion
26.	Bad Squad	Kisii, Mombasa, Kisauni	Burglary, extortion
27.	Super Power	Eastleigh	Theft, burglary
28.	Chinkororo	Kisii, Nyamira	Murder, defence
29.	Amachuma	Kisii, Nyamira	Murder, defence
30.	Nubians	Kibera	Protection of Nubian community
31.	Kalenjin Warriors of 1992	Molo	Eviction, murder, livestock rustling
32.	Kibera Battalion	Kibera	Extortion, hire by politicians, violence
33.	Kumi Kumi	Kisii	Extortion
34.	Bamba 40	Kisii	Robbery, burglary
35.	Loma Oyan	Garissa Town	Pick pocketing, robbery on the streets and dark alleys
36.	Haki La Kuishi	Khwisero	Burglary, theft
37.	Land Lord	Khwisero	Burglary, theft

38.	Mafia	Luanda, Emuhaya	Drug trafficking, theft
39.	Down Town	Luanda, Emusire, Kombewa	Stealing motorcycles, power saw engines
40.	Waka Waka	Maseno Hills	Drugs, pick pocketing, attacking mourners at night
41.	Al Qaeda	Maseno Hills	Drug trafficking, planting of drugs
42.	Siafu	Kibera	Extortion, provide security, mobilize people to attend political rallies, resolve disputes, provide water and electricity illegally
43.	Kamukunji Pressure Group	Kibera	Extortion, provide security, mobilize people to attend political rallies, resolve disputes, provide water and electricity illegally
44.	Yes We Can	Kibera	Extortion, provide security, mobilize people to attend political rallies, resolve disputes, provide water and electricity illegally
45.	J-10	Kibera	Extortion, provide security, mobilize people to attend political rallies, resolve disputes, provide water and electricity illegally